Saudi Arabia and the U.S.: Two Leaders, Two Worlds, One Shared Planet

As Washington and Riyadh pursue divergent geopolitical paths, the United States' drive to maintain global hegemony increasingly compels Saudi Arabia to assert its sovereignty and defend the foundational tenets of Islam.

The U.S.-Saudi alliance stands as one of the most anomalous and intricate partnerships in modern geopolitical history. Viewed through the lens of leadership, it represents a striking paradox: the intersection of two dominant powers—each reigning supreme within its respective sphere—yet bound to coexist on a single planet.

1. Hegemonic Policy: The U.S. as the Guarantor of the Global Order

Since the twilight of World War II, a primary pillar of U.S. foreign policy has been the preservation of American hegemony, casting Washington as the ultimate "guarantor of the global order." The core of this strategy lies in preventing the rise of any peer competitor capable of challenging American dominance.

  • The "New World Order": In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, President George H.W. Bush famously codified this vision. Since then, U.S. defense doctrines have consistently aimed to preempt the emergence of any rival power capable of contesting American preeminence.

  • An External Perspective: This stance has drawn sharp external criticism. In June 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin lambasted the U.S. for crowning itself the sole post-Cold War hyperpower. He argued that Western elites operate under an illusion of perpetual control, blind to the reality that their unipolar order is fracturing as rising nations assert their own global influence.

  • American Exceptionalism: Domestically, this sentiment is deeply ingrained. An early-2021 YouGov poll revealed that a majority of patriotic Americans view their nation not just as a beacon of freedom, but as the world's greatest power and the rightful leader of the free world.

2. Leader of the Muslim World: Saudi Arabia as the Protector of the Faith

On the other side of the geopolitical ledger, Saudi Arabia has long positioned itself as the anchor of the Middle East and the vanguard of Arab interests.

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Since 1986, every sitting Saudi monarch has adopted this title. This designation underscores a sacred duty to act as the spiritual and political shepherd of the global Muslim community (the Ummah), extending Riyadh's influence far beyond its geographical borders.

In March 2022, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) reaffirmed this bedrock identity, stating that the Kingdom will remain a monarchy strictly anchored in authentic Islamic principles. Crucially, he framed this not as a rejection of progress, but as a dual strategy: modernizing the state socio-economically while utilizing that very progress to fortify its leadership within the Islamic world.

3. Ideological Rifts: When Two Paradigms Cannot Converge

When two systemic leaders with fundamentally opposing worldviews interact, structural friction is inevitable. This rift manifests in two primary arenas:

  • Islamic Dignity vs. Subservience to Hegemony As the self-professed leader of the Muslim world, Riyadh cannot, on principle, accept a subordinate status. Consequently, Saudi Arabia insists that its ties with Washington be framed strictly as an equal "partnership" or "cooperation" on shared interests, flatly rejecting any narrative of subservience that might compromise its religious legitimacy.

  • Universal Human Rights vs. Islamic Jurisprudence When Western powers criticize Saudi Arabia’s human rights record, Riyadh routinely counters that these contested practices are not abuses, but the lawful execution of Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia). To the Kingdom, Western human rights paradigms often look less like universal truths and more like ideological interference in its sovereign domestic and religious affairs.

This ideological chasm widened during the inaugural Summit for Democracy in December 2021, when President Joe Biden pledged U.S. backing for global democratic reformers. For Riyadh, this rhetoric triggers a profound strategic anxiety: does Washington’s support for domestic activism constitute a covert attempt to subvert the Islamic foundations of the Saudi state? This question remains a persistent, unresolved undercurrent in bilateral ties.

4. Interdependent Interests: The Inseparable Pillars of Cooperation

Yet, despite these deep ideological fault lines, the cold calculus of Realpolitik tethers the two nations together. Their enduring partnership is anchored by three vital pillars:

ðŸĪ The Iranian Threat

Both capitals view Tehran as their paramount regional adversary. Riyadh relies on U.S. military deterrence and intelligence sharing, while Washington views Saudi Arabia as an indispensable regional anchor to check Iranian expansionism.

ðŸ›Ą️ Military and Security Synergy

The bedrock of this alliance was poured in February 1945, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt met King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy. There, the legendary grand bargain was struck: American protection for the Saudi throne in exchange for prioritized access to Saudi oil.

  • The Pentagon’s Top Client: Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reveals that between 2016 and 2020, Saudi Arabia was the world's top arms importer, with the U.S. serving as its primary supplier—devouring roughly 24% of all U.S. weapons exports.

  • The Security Umbrella: With the U.S. Fifth Fleet and American personnel stationed in the Gulf, Riyadh has operated under Washington’s security umbrella for over eighty years. While the Kingdom has recently sought to diversify its defense procurement—courting partners like Beijing and Paris—untangling itself from total reliance on U.S. hardware remains a decades-long, highly intricate puzzle.

ðŸ›Ē️ Global Energy Orchestration

Hydrocarbons remain the tissue that connects both nations. When President Biden flew to Jeddah in 2022, his primary objective was to persuade the Kingdom to pump more crude to cool down a scorching global energy market.

Even as the U.S. has transitioned into a major domestic energy producer and net exporter, global oil prices remain tightly bound to international dynamics, leaving energy as a potent geopolitical lever. The question hanging over Washington is simple: on what terms will Riyadh cooperate? Will it be a negotiation among equals, or will the Kingdom bow to the economic leverage of the Western hegemon?

Conclusion: Radically Different, Yet Compelled to Coexist

The essence of this fragile yet durable equilibrium was captured perfectly by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during Biden’s 2022 Jeddah visit:

"It is natural for countries to hold different values, and we must respect those differences. If the United States wishes to deal only with countries that agree with it one hundred percent, it would be left with no allies outside of NATO."

This is the unvarnished reality of contemporary geopolitics. The United States and Saudi Arabia are the undisputed leaders of two vastly different worlds, separated by contrasting ideological fault lines. Yet, bound by inescapable strategic, military, and energy imperatives, they have no choice but to manage their friction and coexist—as partners and rivals—on this single, shared planet.

17 July 2022
Chanchai Kumpunya
(āļŠāļēāļāļŠัāļĒ āļ„ุ้āļĄāļ›ัāļāļāļē)
Latest update 30 June 2026
Editorial Note: This article is an expanded English adaptation of the author's original column published in Thai Post Newspaper on 17/07/2022.

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