The South China Sea’s Endless Endgame: Can the Code of Conduct Survive a New Era of Great Power Rivalry?
For over two decades, the quest for a binding Code of Conduct has been the diplomatic centerpiece of Southeast Asia. But as geopolitical tectonic plates shift, the region’s grand bargain remains stuck in neutral.
The
journey to forge a "Code of Conduct in the South China Sea" (COC) has
been a masterclass in diplomatic endurance. Dating back to the 2002
"Declaration on the Conduct of Parties" (DOC), ASEAN and China have
spent more than twenty years pushing negotiating frameworks and hashing out a
Single Draft Negotiating Text—currently mired in its third reading.
On
the surface, the diplomatic machinery is humming. Procedurally, there has been
notable headway. But structurally, the foundational fault lines remain exactly
where they were two decades ago. Worse, these old disputes are now colliding
with rapidly shifting global geopolitics, leaving the future of the COC laden
with uncertainty and unpredictable variables.
The "Legally Binding" Trap and the Consensus Wall
The
core, long-standing question of whether the COC will actually be "legally
binding" remains the central dividing line. Back in 2017, ASEAN and China
successfully agreed on a "Framework for the COC." Yet, the text
notably omits any explicit requirement for strict legal enforcement, falling
far short of what hardline ASEAN claimant states demand.
Recently,
Beijing adopted a more proactive posture, pushing for an accelerated timeline
to conclude the COC by 2026—coinciding with the ASEAN chairmanships of Malaysia
(2025) and the Philippines (2026). However, analysts remain deeply skeptical.
Deep-seated substantive gaps persist, particularly across three unresolved core
issues:
- Geographical Scope: Beijing wants to limit
the COC strictly to the disputed Spratly Islands. Several ASEAN members,
however, insist it must cover the Paracel Islands and overlapping
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).
- Legal Status: Will the COC
materialize as a binding international treaty, or remain a political
commitment lacking enforcement teeth?
- Dispute Settlement: The inclusion of
international arbitration or judicial mechanisms remains a red line
fiercely opposed by China.
On
the regional front, negotiations continually run into a classic structural
hurdle: ASEAN’s consensus principle. Because certain member states—namely
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar—maintain exceptionally close ties with Beijing,
building a unified front to pressure China into accepting stringent legal
obligations is nearly impossible. In practice, these states often act as
diplomatic "spoilers," diluting the more aggressive proposals put
forward by the Philippines or Vietnam.
Concurrently,
China maintains a firm condition: the negotiation process must remain entirely
"free from external superpower interference," specifically targeting
the United States. Finding a middle ground between an internationally binding
pact and Beijing’s vision of sovereign containment remains an intractable
bottleneck.
Shifting Casts and the Geopolitical Theater
Annual
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (AMM) and Summits continue to serve as arenas
where geopolitical friction plays out in real time. Efforts to insert strong
language condemning land reclamation, artificial island-building, and
militarization remain constant flashpoints in drafting the Joint Communiqués.
The Philippine Pivot: From Duterte to Marcos Jr.
Internal
political shifts in the Philippines stand out as the most pivotal variable in
the contemporary South China Sea equation. Under President Rodrigo Duterte
(2016–2022), Manila temporarily sidelined the landmark 2016 international
arbitral ruling, pivoting instead toward close economic cooperation with China.
Tensions visibly de-escalated.
But
when Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. took office in 2022, the script
flipped. The Marcos administration resurrected the 2016 ruling as its legal
bedrock and dramatically expanded security cooperation with the U.S. This
includes expanding Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites from
five to nine, incorporating bases in Palawan and northern Luzon—locations
strategically close to the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Manila has
also tightened maritime ties with Japan, Australia, and Canada through
Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAAs) and joint patrols.
Escalating Gray-Zone Tactics
The
physical environment at sea between 2023 and 2025 grew alarmingly tense,
particularly around Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal) and Scarborough Shoal.
Here, the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime
Militia (PAFMM) deployed increasingly aggressive tactics to block resupply
missions to the grounded Philippine Navy ship BRP Sierra Madre.
The
most alarming incidents involved Chinese forces deploying high-pressure water
cannons against Philippine resupply vessels, injuring sailors and damaging
ships. Such events illustrated China's systematic escalation of "gray zone
tactics"—ranging from maritime blockades and military-grade lasers to
intentional ramming and the deployment of floating barriers.
Vietnam’s Quiet Buildup
Vietnam, meanwhile, maintains a cautious but resolute posture. While avoiding Manila’s open confrontation, Hanoi is playing the long game. It has steadily built up its military capabilities—acquiring Russian-built Kilo-class submarines and upgrading naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. According to data from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), Vietnam has also quietly accelerated its own island reclamation work across its controlled features in the Spratlys.
The Great Power Shadow: Intensified Competition
South
China Sea tensions extend far beyond freedom of navigation; they are
inextricably linked to the broader great power competition between the U.S. and
China, which has intensified sharply in recent years.
From "Pivot" to "Integrated Deterrence"
Under
Washington's "integrated deterrence" strategy, Indo-Pacific security
cooperation has scaled new heights. The formation of minilateral frameworks
like AUKUS and the Quad, alongside milestone trilateral summits between the
U.S., Japan, and the Philippines, carry profound implications for the regional
balance of power. Joint military exercises have expanded in frequency and
scale, prompting Beijing to denounce these moves as provocations designed to
"internationalize" regional disputes.
Beijing’s Hardened Posture
On
the other side, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to steadily
enhance its military footprint. This includes installing anti-ship and
anti-aircraft missile systems on artificial islands, stationing fighter jets on
airbases built over Mischief, Subi, and Fiery Cross reefs, and expanding nuclear
submarine deployments from Hainan. Furthermore, Beijing announced baselines
around Scarborough Shoal—a significant legal assertion responding directly to
Manila’s passage of new maritime zone laws.
The Taiwan Overlay
The
cross-strait situation has become an inescapable overlay to the South China Sea
equation. Heightened tensions driven by Chinese military drills around Taiwan
have led U.S. and allied strategists to view the South China Sea and the Taiwan
Strait as a single, contiguous theater of operations. This interlinkage makes
COC negotiations even more intricate, as Beijing views any U.S. military
footprint in the South China Sea strictly through the lens of the "Taiwan
question."
A Managed Crisis on a Razor’s Edge
Friction
at sea underscores that the South China Sea dispute remains a "manageable
conflict." Yet, the line separating management from total escalation is
thinning rapidly, driven by three critical factors:
- Manila's formal
invocation that Article 4 of the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT) extends to armed attacks in the South China Sea, raising the stakes
of maritime skirmishes into potential great power clashes.
- Beijing's implementation
of the 2021 Coast Guard Law, authorizing armed force against foreign
vessels breaching Chinese-claimed waters.
- ASEAN’s continued reliance on dialogue to avert catastrophic military conflict while maintaining a delicate balance between Washington and Beijing.
Three Paths Forward
Moving
forward with the COC resembles water sitting perpetually close to the boiling
point. The path ahead branches into three distinct scenarios:
- Scenario 1: The
Watered-Down Compromise. ASEAN and Beijing agree on a diluted COC that carries
political weight rather than acting as a full-fledged treaty. This
"weighted political agreement" establishes incident prevention
protocols and hotlines while deliberately sidestepping sensitive issues
like legal status and binding dispute settlement.
- Scenario 2: The
Perpetual Process.
Proposed implementation timelines fall through. Escalating field friction
sours the diplomatic climate, reducing the COC to a never-ending
diplomatic tool rather than a practical destination, with both sides
defaulting to the old DOC.
- Scenario 3: The
Diplomatic Collapse.
A severe crisis at sea—such as a fatal military clash or Beijing declaring
an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China
Sea—completely stalls the COC process, inviting non-ASEAN mechanisms (like
the Quad or the UN Security Council) to take center stage.
More Than Just Maritime Rules
Ultimately,
the South China Sea is much more than a dispute over maritime rights or natural
resources; it serves as a mirror reflecting the broader transformation of the
global order as it transitions from a unipolar moment to intense great power
competition. ASEAN member states utilize this diplomatic arena to address
domestic security and national politics while maintaining regional geopolitical
equilibrium.
The
COC remains a long-term saga that the region's 680 million people must closely
watch. The critical question is not simply when the COC will be finalized, but
whether ASEAN Centrality can survive the raging crosswinds of superpower
rivalry. For ultimately, if ASEAN cannot demonstrate unity and leadership
within its own backyard, the future of the COC will measure not just maritime
rules, but the survival of Southeast Asia's entire security architecture.
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