The Balance of Power Theory in the ASEAN Context

"The Balance of Power theory is a widely utilized concept originating from the Realist School of international relations. Its primary function is to counterbalance adversarial factions to prevent any single party from gaining a decisive advantage, thereby deterring them from going to war. Currently, ASEAN is leveraging this strategy to balance the scales between China and the United States, encouraging both superpowers to pursue constructive policies toward the region. However, because the Balance of Power theory possesses inherent weaknesses, it must be approached with great caution."

1. Understanding the "Balance of Power" Theory

The Balance of Power theory is a cornerstone concept developed by the Realist School of International Relations. Historically, this concept was tangibly operationalized in Europe following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and persisted until the eve of World War I.

This era granted Europe 266 years of relative strategic peace, as no single nation emerged as a total hegemon capable of absolute dominance. Consequently, this mechanism evolved into a global security architecture that continues to exert significant influence today.

Scholars such as A. E. Campbell and Richard Dean Burns posit that the balance of power rests on a simple premise: if a group of nations can maintain a "just equilibrium," each state will possess sufficient strength and bargaining leverage to assert its true interests without fear of annexation or subjugation.

How the Balance of Power Works:

  • Counterbalancing Forces: The primary objective is to constantly equalize power between adversarial blocs.
  • The Role of the "Balancer": If one side gains a distinct advantage, previously neutral nations must pivot to support the disadvantaged party, thereby pulling the scales back to the center.
  • The Outcome: When all parties recognize that a decisive military victory is unattainable, major violent conflicts are effectively deterred.

In a world governed by the balance of power, "there are no permanent allies or perpetual enemies," only continuous counterbalancing to ensure no state dares to initiate aggression.

2. The ASEAN Context: Caught Between Great Powers

Today, the ASEAN region has transformed into a critical geopolitical battleground due to the presence of two global superpowers: China and the United States. ASEAN maintains deep historical ties with both; it shares over a millennium of relations with China, while the contemporary global influence of the United States remains glaringly evident.

The competition for influence between these two power blocs impacts ASEAN across all dimensions, particularly through ever-growing economic and social interdependencies. Concurrently, China's robust rise has fueled anxiety within Washington, which fears losing its global primacy. As a result, the U.S. has implemented various forms of containment policies.

Key flashpoints—such as disputes in the South China Sea, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), and overlapping territorial claims between China and certain ASEAN member states—have served as primary avenues for the U.S. to entrench itself in the region, thereby escalating tensions with Beijing.

3. ASEAN's Balance of Power Strategy

Although ASEAN comprises 10 member nations, its collective military and economic power cannot directly confront China or the U.S. head-on. ASEAN's primary challenge is how to maintain regional stability and order so that its member states can continue to develop. Consequently, ASEAN has adapted the "Balance of Power" theory into its regional approach through two core strategies:

First: Avoiding Direct Confrontation (No Direct Clash)

Going toe-to-toe with a superpower individually is not a viable strategy. While ASEAN and its member states can assert firm stances to protect their national interests, they must do so without crossing red lines that could trigger a major war—a conflict they cannot win and which would result in catastrophic damage. This strategy emphasizes resolving issues through peaceful means to restore stability.

  • Case Studies of the Philippines and Vietnam: Both countries have experienced intense maritime disputes with China, leading to multiple standoffs. However, they ultimately managed to prevent these incidents from spiraling into full-scale war through both direct and secret diplomacy, successfully de-escalating tensions periodically.

Second: Demanding Constructive Engagement

A hard truth of global politics is that whether ASEAN invites them or not, both China and the U.S. will inevitably intervene in the region, driven by the inherent instincts of great powers. Since their presence cannot be blocked, ASEAN turns this challenge into an opportunity by welcoming both sides to engage, under the strict condition that "their roles must be constructive and mutually counterbalancing" to maximize regional benefits.

Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong offered a realistic analysis: competition between superpowers is inevitable, but the crucial variable is the form that competition takes.

  • The View on China: Competition should occur within the framework of international rules and norms. A prime example is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Although the AIIB expands China's global footprint, it undeniably meets the infrastructure funding needs of the region. This represents a constructive relationship, analogous to the mechanisms of the IMF, World Bank, or Japan's prominent role in the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Singapore, therefore, supports such engagement.
  • The View on the United States: At the Special U.S.-ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in Rancho Mirage, California, PM Lee stated that the U.S. is an indispensable partner. He expressed hope that the U.S. would continue to engage constructively with ASEAN—much like during the Obama administration—covering counter-terrorism, freedom of navigation, and adherence to international law. A steady, deeply rooted U.S. presence encourages all parties to play by the rules and utilize peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms.

ASEAN's Diplomatic Nuance: PM Lee's remarks imply that ASEAN is ready to support the U.S. provided it plays a constructive role and maintains regional order. However, should the U.S. act disruptively, ASEAN is prepared to distance itself and lean closer to China to restore the balance.

Furthermore, in the broader strategic picture, ASEAN does not ignore other key actors. It brings players like Japan, the European Union (EU), Russia, and India into the balancing act. India, in particular, is expanding rapidly along ASEAN's western flank and is now the world's most populous nation, adding another crucial layer to the regional equilibrium.

4. Weaknesses and Limitations of the Balance of Power Theory

Despite being an effective conceptual framework, the Balance of Power theory possesses three major weaknesses and practical limitations:

Theoretical Weakness

Details and Practical Limitations

1. Difficulty in Assessing True Power

In the real world, measuring an adversary's exact power to establish a perfect balance is incredibly difficult. Military power depends on more than just the quantity of weapons or personnel; it requires calculating complex variables like economic resilience, internal political cohesion, and demographic structures.

2. Fragility in Maintaining Equilibrium

Sustaining a state of balance is highly precarious because both domestic and international contexts are in constant flux. If a balancing nation faces internal constraints or if its citizenry loses interest in maintaining that balance, the entire counterbalancing mechanism can easily collapse.

3. The Innate Ambition of States to Dominate

This theory presumes that all states wish to coexist peacefully. Yet, history is replete with power-hungry leaders who disregarded equilibrium. For example, Hitler in WWII sought to create an Aryan society rather than maintain a balance; the Soviet Union aimed for a global proletarian revolution; and Imperial Japan attacked the U.S. with the explicit intent of dominating Asia.

Lessons from the Peloponnesian War: In 431 BCE, a catastrophic war broke out between Sparta and Athens. Historian Thucydides explained that although the two city-states initially coexisted peacefully, when Sparta witnessed Athens' power expanding relentlessly, it grew terrified of a future invasion. Consequently, Sparta decided to launch a preemptive strike. This demonstrates that the theory cannot always prevent a state, terrified of losing its relative power, from initiating war.

5. Conclusion: Critical Caveats for ASEAN in Executing this Strategy

For ASEAN, relying on the Balance of Power theory raises critical questions that must be carefully scrutinized:

  • The Sincerity of Superpowers: If a severe crisis erupts, would China hesitate to step in to assist ASEAN, and how genuine would that assistance be? Conversely, is the United States truly prepared to absorb significant strategic and economic costs to counterbalance China on behalf of ASEAN?
  • The Risk of Alignment (The Philippine Case Study): Analyst Eric Chiou noted that the Philippines, as a smaller nation with limited defense capabilities, has been highly proactive in drawing the U.S. in, granting American military access to its facilities in exchange for protection against Chinese threats. However, this strategy could prove to be a double-edged sword that "drags the nation into a harsher confrontation with China than before." This risk is especially acute during periods of perceived U.S. decline, where the Philippines ultimately risks being abandoned by its superpower patron.
21 February 2016
Chanchai Kumpunya
(ชาญชัย คุ้มปัญญา)
Latest update 2 July 2026
Editorial Note: This article is an expanded English adaptation of the author's original column published in Thai Post Newspaper on 21/02/2016.

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References:

1. Acharya, Amitav. (2014). Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR. In David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (Eds.), International Relations of Asia (2nd ed.). Maryland : Rowman & Littlefield.
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3. Campbell, A. E., & Burns, Richard Dean. (2002). Balance of Power. In Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy (2nd Ed., Vol 1). USA: Sage Publications.
4. Chiou, Eric. (2014, February 26). The shadow of conflict in East Asia. Taipei Times. Retrieved from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2014/02/26/2003584357
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6. Lee Hsien Loong. (2015, May 29). Keynote Address: Lee Hsien Loong. IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2015. Retrieved from https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2015-862b/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-6729/keynote-address-a51f
7. Magstadt, Thomas M. (2009). Understanding Politics (8th Ed.). CA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning.
8. Rafferty, Kirsten., & Mansbach, Richard. (2012). Introduction to Global Politics (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
9. Spykerman, Kimberly. (2016, February 16). PM Lee outlines 3 trends that will influence the strategic landscape in Asia. Channel News Asia. Retrieved from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/pm-lee-outlines-3-trends/2519878.html
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