Is the GCC in Trouble? If Iraq Defeats IS (1)

The Battle of Tikrit—capital of the Saladin Governorate and the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein—is emerging as a defining watershed moment in the contemporary history of the Middle East. This critical turning point sees the Iraqi federal army joining forces with powerful Shiite militias under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in a massive, coordinated military offensive to dislodge and reclaim this strategic stronghold from the Islamic State (IS/ISIL/ISIS).

In hindsight, looking back to the zenith of IS’s power, it is an undeniable historical reality that certain Iraqi Sunni tribes and local factions within the "Sunni Triangle" actively facilitated the group's meteoric rise. Driven by deep-seated resentment against the overtly sectarian policies of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite-led government in Baghdad, these marginalized communities created a security and political vacuum. IS exploited this societal fracture perfectly, swallowing key cities like Mosul and Tikrit with terrifying speed.

Now, however, the pendulum of war is swinging back. The Iraqi government and its aligned Shiite militias have seized the initiative, securing the upper hand on the battlefield. This shift prompts a critical question among global defense analysts:

If IS is successfully dismantled and purged from Iraq, how will the fallout reshape the strategic calculus of surrounding regional heavyweights?

Chief among the frontline actors caught in this geopolitical crossfire is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Comprising six monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain—the bloc’s immediate geographical proximity to Iraq means its security is inextricably linked to Baghdad’s stability. The collapse of IS introduces a highly volatile, complex, and multifaceted strategic equation for the Gulf capitals.

Understanding the GCC: The Shield and Balance of Power in the Gulf

The GCC was forged in 1981 against the backdrop of the Cold War and mounting regional instability. While its founding charter emphasizes economic, political, and cultural integration, through a Realist lens, its true raison d'être was the creation of a collective security shield. This was a direct, defensive response to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, which established a hostile Shiite theocracy intent on exporting its revolutionary ideology. The Sunni monarchies felt an urgent imperative to consolidate power to counterbalance and contain Tehran’s revisionist ambitions.

Over the past three decades, economic integration has proven to be the bloc's most triumphant and tangible milestone, backed by their colossal leverage as global energy powerhouses.

The Gulf's Energy Clout (Data as of 2014): Together, the GCC nations command approximately 40% of the world's proven oil reserves and 25% of its natural gas reserves. This massive hydrocarbon wealth has allowed them to project outsized diplomatic influence and build some of the largest Sovereign Wealth Funds on the planet.

Conversely, collective defense cooperation has historically lagged. Guarded over their individual military sovereignty, member states treated the Peninsula Shield Force (established in 1984) as a largely symbolic rapid-deployment unit. It was only the recent onslaught of asymmetric warfare, violent non-state actors, and bruising regional proxy conflicts that forced the Gulf monarchies to urgently operationalize and upgrade their collective defense architecture.

The Security Equation: A Complex Calculation of Gains and Losses for the GCC

Evaluating what an IS collapse in Iraq means for the GCC requires looking past a simple binary. To map out this intricate landscape, Part 1 explores the positive strategic dividends and proactive countermeasures adopted by the bloc.

Tangible Benefits: Crushing an Existential Threat to the Crowns

From an internal security standpoint, IS is far more dangerous than a conventional insurgent group—it represents an existential ideological threat to the very survival of the Gulf monarchies. The foundational objective of IS is the total eradication of modern Middle Eastern borders, which it decries as artificial relics of Western imperial cartography, to be replaced by a transnational Caliphate. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared himself "Caliph"—a title that, under their hyper-radicalized theology, demands the absolute, uncompromised allegiance of every Muslim worldwide across both spiritual and political domains.

The Threat to the Crowns: Within Baghdadi’s extremist framework, the ruling royal families of the GCC are viewed as apostate regimes devoid of Islamic legitimacy. Their overthrow is considered a religious necessity to bring the holy lands of Arabia under the Caliphate’s black banner. For the Gulf capitals, this is an existential red line.

In Sunni political thought, the Caliphate is a complex, deeply revered historical institution. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire stood as its last grand manifestation, operating with the Quran as its ultimate constitutional anchor and a sovereign validated by the Shura (a consultative council of Islamic scholars and jurists).

Historically, however, the institution of the Caliphate ebbed and flowed, frequently clashing with dynastic kingdoms and modern monarchies where rulers held absolute territorial power separate from institutional religious frameworks. Following World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman state, the last universally recognized Caliph, Abdulmejid II, was deposed, and the institution was formally abolished by the nascent Turkish Republic.

Baghdadi’s self-proclamation positioned him as the 32nd Caliph in this historic lineage. While the international community and the overwhelming majority of mainstream Muslims immediately dismissed his claim as fraudulent, the underlying ideology possessed a potent, virulent capacity for individual radicalization. It successfully ensnared extremist sympathizers within the GCC borders, prompting some to covertly funnel financial capital or slip across frontiers to join the battlefield.

By enforcing a brutal, puritanical strand of Salafi-Jihadism that labels Shiites and non-Muslims as heretics marked for subjugation or death, IS alienated the Islamic establishment. Mainstream clerical bodies across the globe—most notably the senior religious authorities in Saudi Arabia—swiftly weaponized theological counters, issuing Fatwas (religious edicts) excommunicating IS from the fold of true Islam.

Deep Dive: The GCC's Two Core Policies on the Iraq Crisis

To insulate themselves from the geopolitical fallout, the GCC states harmonized their foreign policies around two main strategic pillars:

Strategic Policy

Implementation and Operational Measures

1. Military & Ideological Eradication

• Integrated into the US-led global coalition against IS.

• Deployed air wings (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar) to strike deep into IS strongholds.

• Enacted sweeping domestic counter-terror financing laws and travel bans on foreign fighters.

2. Preservation of the Iraqi Status Quo

• Reaffirmed a strict diplomatic stance upholding Iraq's unity and territorial integrity.

• Opposed unilateral foreign interventions that bypass Baghdad's sovereign authority.

• Advocated for a centralized, cohesive Iraqi state to prevent catastrophic ethnic or sectarian partition.

Policy Pillar 1: Military and Ideological Containment

This iron-fist strategy was championed aggressively by the regional heavyweight, Saudi Arabia. The late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz (who passed away in early 2015) delivered a scathing indictment of the group: "These terrorists use religion as a facade to conceal their personal interests, aiming to attack our homelands and our children, with the ultimate goal of sowing division among Muslims." Similarly, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister at the time, explicitly branded IS as "an evil that tarnishes the true image of Islam."

The GCC's military contributions mirrored the US-led coalition's playbook: utilizing tactical airpower to blunt IS's territorial expansion while deploying financial blockades and intelligence networks to choke off their capital streams. Security assessments confirmed that these synchronized pressures successfully degraded IS’s frontline manpower and pulverized its heavy military hardware.

Policy Pillar 2: Upholding Iraq's Territorial Integrity

In March 2015, a joint GCC declaration strongly backed Iraq’s total sovereignty. Yet, this diplomatic posture harbored a glaring geopolitical paradox. On the ground, Iraq’s map had already fractured into three de facto fiefdoms:

1.    The Southern and Central Belts: Governed by the Shiite-led central administration and its allied militias.

2.    The Northern Tier: The autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), defended by its own battle-hardened Peshmerga forces.

3.    The Western and North-Central Core: The volatile, Sunni-dominated heartlands that became the primary engine and theater for IS operations.

Consequently, preserving Iraq as a unified, cohesive state remains an elusive ambition so long as the deep-seated structural power imbalances and sectarian grievances of the Sunni population are left unaddressed.

Comprehensive Analysis: A New Balance of Power and the Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy

Broadly speaking, the rise and subsequent containment of IS acted as a powerful catalyst, structurally elevating the GCC's geopolitical agency in two profound ways:

1. International Politics and Diplomacy

The vacuum forced the GCC—spearheaded by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi—to pivot toward a highly proactive, interventionist leadership role in the Arab world. Since 1945, Gulf security policy operated under a dependent US defensive umbrella, a transactional arrangement famously dubbed the "oil-for-security" paradigm.

In recent years, however, regional shifts have driven the GCC to pursue Strategic Autonomy. Shaken by anxieties that Washington would abandon them during an existential crisis—a fear validated by the US willingness to negotiate the JCPOA nuclear pact with Iran—the Gulf monarchies began diversifying their strategic portfolios. They opened new geopolitical lanes, aggressively expanding economic, diplomatic, and defense ties eastward, particularly with Beijing and Moscow.

Simultaneously, member states have attempted to accelerate internal integration, floating the concept of a tightly knit "Gulf Union" to align foreign policy and defense architectures. The crown jewel of this push is the ongoing negotiation for a "Joint Arab Force" engineered to combat asymmetric, non-state threats. Should this unified military command fully materialize, it will permanently redraw the security architecture of the Middle East.

2. Religious Authority and Ideology

By taking the vanguard against IS, the GCC successfully positioned itself as the preeminent institutional authority within Sunni Islam capable of delegitimizing theological extremism. Projecting themselves as the global guardians of moderate Islam has yielded immense diplomatic currency, validating the ruling establishments on the world stage and signaling that mainstream Islam unconditionally rejects religious barbarism.

In the short term, a definitive defeat of IS on the Tikrit battlefield and across Iraq hands the GCC a massive tactical victory, neutralizing a virulent ideological contagion designed to topple their thrones.

But in the unforgiving theater of Middle Eastern geopolitics, "when one fear recedes, a far more formidable adversary rushes into the vacuum."

The impending collapse of the Caliphate is not being achieved by the raw power of the conventional Iraqi army alone. Instead, it is being propelled by battle-tested, highly radicalized Shiite militias—covertly bankrolled, strategically directed, and logistically sustained by the security apparatus and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran, the absolute number-one strategic nemesis of the Gulf states.

In the next installment, we will delve deeply into the looming "negative impacts and silent strategic threats" that are bound to cause severe headaches for the GCC if IS is completely crushed, yet Iraq falls entirely under the shadow of Iranian hegemony.

22 March 2015
Chanchai Kumpunya
(ชาญชัย คุ้มปัญญา)
Latest update 5 July 2026
Editorial Note: This article is an expanded English adaptation of the author's original column published in Thai Post Newspaper.
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References:

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